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Notes 
FEDERALIZING THE FIRST  
RESPONDERS TO ACTS OF TERRORISM  
VIA THE MILITIA CLAUSES 
BRIAN C. BROOK 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine over two thousand men, women, and children quietly 
watching a performance of the Nutcracker Suite at the Denver 
Performing Arts Studio. Afterward, the audience and performers 
leave to return to their daily routine. Two days later, the first signs of 
illness appear. Though it is initially dismissed by most as ordinary 
cough and fever, as more and more cases pour in, doctors run a 
broader series of tests. The results confirm a nightmare—the 
audience and cast have been infected with bubonic plague, released 
into the air system during the ballet performance. Airborne, the 
disease can pass from one person to another by a simple cough. Often 
fatal, it places thousands of lives in imminent danger. Indeed, with 
Denver International Airport nearby, millions of lives could be lost as 
travelers carry the plague throughout the United States and 
beyond1—unless, that is, immediate and effective measures are 
implemented to combat the awful aftermath of this act of 
bioterrorism. 
But what precisely are those immediate and effective measures? 
This is a technical question, and one for which there are undoubtedly 
scores of possible answers. Perhaps a better question, then, is: who 
 
Copyright © 2005 Brian C. Brook. 
 1. This hypothetical is derived from one of the fictional scenarios actually tested as part of 
the TOPOFF (“Top Officials”) exercises, which were a series of tests conducted to assess the 
nation’s readiness to respond to the use of weapons of mass destruction on U.S. soil. For a full 
description of TOPOFF Denver, see Richard E. Hoffman & Jane E. Norton, Lessons Learned 
from a Full-Scale Bioterrorism Exercise, EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES, Nov–Dec 2000, at 
652, available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol6no6/pdf/hoffmann.pdf. 
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has the authority both to decide which measures should be chosen 
and how they should be executed? This Note addresses that 
important legal question by suggesting a constitutionally sound 
method for ensuring an immediate and effective response to terrorist 
attacks on American soil. The proposed method uses the Militia 
Clauses of the Constitution2 to bring state and local emergency 
response personnel under federal authority. 
Although federal agencies such as the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), acting under the authority and 
control of the president, are theoretically well-equipped to deal with 
these situations, the problem is one of first responders. If roads are to 
be closed, buildings evacuated, or infected victims quarantined to 
avoid the further spread of disease or more deaths, time is absolutely 
of the essence. Local doctors and law enforcement cannot simply sit 
and wait for federal assistance to arrive before taking action. 
Unfortunately, despite increased funding after 9/11 and years of 
preparation, state and local governments are not ready to respond to 
terrorist attacks, biological or otherwise.3 An effective response 
requires federal involvement.4 Unfortunately, recent federalism 
jurisprudence hinders the development of an effective response 
 
 2. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15–16. 
Congress shall have the power . . . 
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress 
Insurrections and repel Invasions; 
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing 
such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving 
to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of 
training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. 
 3. See Senator Byron Dorgan, Democratic Policy Committee, Are We Prepared? The 
Bush Administration’s Failure to Help Local Communities Prevent and Respond to Terrorism, 
at http://democrats.senate.gov/~dpc/pubs/108-1-088.html (last visited July 18, 2005) (listing the 
failures of the Bush administration in funding and preparing state and local first responders) (on 
file with the Duke Law Journal) TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH, READY OR NOT? 
PROTECTING THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH IN THE AGE OF BIOTERRORISM 6 (Dec. 2003), at 
http://healthyamericans.org/state/bioterror/ Bioterror.pdf (noting that after two years and nearly 
$2 billion of federal bioterrorism preparedness funding, “states are only modestly better 
prepared . . . than they were prior to 9/11”) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 4. See JAMES F. MCDONNELL, CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN FEDERAL MANAGEMENT OF 
DOMESTIC TERRORISM INCIDENTS 36 (2004) (“A response to terrorism in the United States 
will require federal involvement due to the complexity of the threat and unique national 
capabilities.”). 
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mechanism that would combine local manpower with federal 
expertise.5 
This Note argues that the Constitution’s oft-ignored Militia 
Clauses6 nonetheless allow the federal government to direct the states 
and their first responders to prepare for and ultimately combat acts of 
terrorism on American soil. Part I explains why the Court’s Tenth 
Amendment jurisprudence prohibits the federal government from 
coordinating the actions of first responders: such coordination would 
constitute impermissible “commandeering.”7 The Militia Clauses, 
however, expressly empower Congress to commandeer the states 
during specific times of need, and therefore should be considered an 
exception to the general prohibition on commandeering. Part II 
provides a brief history of the Militia Clauses and, more generally, the 
militia in the United States, explaining who comprises the militia and 
how Congress can organize it. Finally, Part III argues that the federal 
government may use the Militia Clauses to regulate first responders 
to acts of terrorism on United States soil. In so doing, the Militia 
Clauses could be revived as a fundamental component of the 
constitutional system for national security. 
I.  THE HINDRANCE OF THE TENTH  
AMENDMENT TO COORDINATING FIRST RESPONDERS 
The Supreme Court’s Tenth Amendment8 jurisprudence, 
construing the limits of the Commerce Clause,9 works to prevent the 
 
 5. See id. (“The Lopez case highlights the limits of the Congress to mandate federal law 
enforcement involvement in public safety issues.”); infra Part I (discussing Tenth Amendment 
limitations on federal entanglement with state police functions). 
 6. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15–16. 
 7. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (“The Federal Government may 
neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the 
States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal 
regulatory program.”). 
 8. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”). 
 9. The Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, is mentioned here because it is the 
workhorse of the federal government—no other provision has been construed to empower the 
federal government to regulate as broad a swath of activity as has the Commerce Clause. See 
Alex Kozinski, Introduction to Volume Nineteen, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 5 (1995) 
(noting that the Commerce Clause has been used to do so much that one might “wonder why 
anyone would make the mistake of calling it the Commerce Clause instead of the ‘Hey, you-can-
do-whatever-you-feel-like Clause’”). 
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federal government from developing effective first-response measures 
to deal with the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack. The 
Supreme Court interprets the Tenth Amendment as prohibiting 
Congress from “commandeering” state governments to serve federal 
Commerce Clause objectives.10 Certain sovereign powers, including 
those ordinary police powers necessary to provide an effective first 
response, are retained solely by the states and therefore cannot be 
reached by the federal government.11 
The first modern case to use the Tenth Amendment to invalidate 
the application of federal law to regulate the states was National 
League of Cities v. Usery,12 in which the Court addressed whether the 
 
 10. See infra notes 21–27 and accompanying text. 
 11. Even though the Tenth Amendment prohibits federal regulation of state executive 
officers, the Tenth Amendment is inapposite to regulation of private individuals. Although the 
regulation of private individuals raises no federalism concerns, at least not as a long as Congress 
is acting within its enumerated powers, the problem of first responders cannot be solved by 
merely regulating private individuals—those who make up the first responders—directly.  
The broadest power of the federal government is undoubtedly the commerce power. See supra 
note 9. However, in light of the Rehnquist Court’s decisions in Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 
540 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990), and United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the Violence Against Women Act), the continued 
expandability of the commerce power to regulate whatever private conduct Congress wants is 
seriously in question. At a minimum, Lopez and Morrison seem to require that the activity 
being regulated by Congress be in some way “economic” in order to fall under the commerce 
power. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (“While we need not adopt a categorical rule against 
aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in 
our Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity 
only where that activity is economic in nature.”). It is no longer enough that Congress simply 
finds that the activity “substantially affect[s]” interstate commerce—the very nature of the 
activity will be scrutinized by the Court. Id. Therein lies the problem of using the commerce 
power to create a completely federal first-response program: the response of police officers, fire 
fighters, doctors and others to such an attack would hardly qualify as economic activity. 
Accordingly, Congress cannot engage in such activity under the commerce power. 
The spending power is similarly insufficient, but more as a practical matter than as a 
constitutional one. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have the Power to 
provide for the common defence and the general welfare . . . .”). Problems with first responders, 
after all, remain despite attempts by the federal government to spend billions of dollars on state 
and local response programs. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Moreover, money could 
only assist in the preparation of first responders, not their deployment; in an emergency, the 
federal government would still lack the coercive capacity to tell the state and local actors 
precisely what to do because that would constitute impermissible commandeering under Printz. 
521 U.S. at 925. 
 12. 426 U.S. 833 (1976); see also Brent E. Simmons, The Invincibility of Constitutional 
Error: The Rehnquist Court’s States Rights Assault on Fourteenth Amendment Protections of 
Individual Rights, 11 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 259, 277 (2001) (“In Usery, the Court had held—
for the first time in forty years—that the Tenth Amendment was an independent limit on 
Congress’ Article I powers.”). 
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states were obligated to follow the minimum wage provisions of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Writing for the Court, then-
Justice Rehnquist explained how FLSA violated the overarching 
principles of federalism and dual sovereignty implicit in the 
Constitution: 
Congress has attempted to exercise its Commerce Clause authority 
to prescribe minimum wages and maximum hours to be paid by the 
States in their capacities as sovereign governments. In so doing, 
Congress has sought to wield its power in a fashion that would 
impair the States’ ability to function effectively in a federal system.13 
Because the rationale for applying FLSA against the states had the 
potential to render them functionally ineffective by eliminating their 
ability to allocate resources freely, FLSA could not be applied to 
regulate the states.14 The Tenth Amendment prevented the federal 
regulation of essential state functions under the Commerce Clause.15 
This new landscape for the Tenth Amendment, however, proved 
ephemeral. 
Nine years later, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority,16 the Court expressly overruled Usery, holding that the 
FLSA should apply to the states17 and obliterating Usery’s “essential 
state functions” test.18 This turn of events resulted from a change in 
position by Justice Blackmun, who wrote for the majority in Garcia 
that the “essential state functions” test had proven itself 
unworkable.19 Rather than hold merely that this was the improper test 
by which to judge federal regulation of the states, the Court held that 
alleged Tenth Amendment violations were essentially nonjusticiable 
political questions.20 
 
 13. Usery, 426 U.S. at 852 (internal quotations omitted). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See id. at 845–46 (“The question we must resolve here, then, is whether these 
determinations are functions essential to separate and independent existence so that Congress 
may not abrogate the States’ otherwise plenary authority to make them.”) (internal quotations 
and citations omitted). 
 16. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 17. Id. at 557. 
 18. This was also referred to as the “traditional government functions” test. Id. at 530. 
 19. See id. at 546–47 (“We therefore now reject, as unsound in principle and unworkable in 
practice, a rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of 
whether a particular governmental function is ‘integral’ or ‘traditional.’”). 
 20. Id. at 556 (“[T]he principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that 
inherent in all congressional action—the built-in restraints that our system provides through 
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Despite the setback to a justiciable federalism in Garcia, the 
Tenth Amendment returned to prominence with the arrival of the 
contemporary Rehnquist Court.21 Once resurrected, the Tenth 
Amendment again limited the power of the federal government, 
albeit this time more narrowly.22 New York v. United States23 involved 
a contest over the validity of a federal mandate that the states, 
through their legislatures, take particular measures to ensure the 
proper disposal of low-level radioactive waste.24 Such a federal 
mandate was impermissible, not because Congress lacked power to 
regulate nuclear waste, but because it required the states to regulate 
the waste in Congress’s stead.25 If the federal government wished to 
regulate conduct, it had to do so directly, not by using the states as 
intermediaries: 
While Congress has substantial powers to govern the Nation 
directly, including in areas of intimate concern to the States, the 
Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress 
the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress’ 
instructions.26 
Thus the anticommandeering principle was born: Congress may not 
commandeer the political machinery of the states into federal 
service.27 
In 1997, the Court extended its New York holding to prevent 
federal commandeering of state executive machinery. That is to say, 
 
state participation in federal governmental action. The political process ensures that the laws 
that unduly burden the States will not be promulgated.”). 
 21. See Tony Mauro, Speculation Swirls About Rehnquist Retirement, NEW YORK LAW. 
(Oct. 7, 2002) (“Once a lone dissenter on issues of federalism, Rehnquist now commands a 
majority—albeit a slim one—that has reined in Congress and restored some ‘dignity’ to the 
states.”). 
 22. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992) (“This litigation presents no 
occasion to apply or revisit the holdings of [Usery or Garcia], as this is not a case in which 
Congress has subjected a State to the same legislation applicable to private parties.”). 
 23. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 24. Id. at 149. 
 25. See id. at 160 (“Regulation of the resulting interstate market in waste disposal is 
therefore well within Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause.”). 
 26. Id. at 162. 
 27. In New York, the Court suggested that the anticommandeering principle was not a 
novel concept; although not used to strike down any legislation, it had been articulated by the 
Court years earlier. See id. at 162–63 (summarizing previous cases in which the Court noted that 
Congress’ actions were appropriate because they did not involve “a federal command to the 
States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations” (quoting FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 
742, 761–62 (1982))). 
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the federal government could not affirmatively direct the conduct of 
state officers.28 In Printz v. United States,29 a pair of police officers 
challenged the Brady Bill, a federal law requiring state law 
enforcement officers to participate in a federal gun-control program.30 
The Court held that the Tenth Amendment prohibited the federal 
government from telling individuals within state executive branches 
what to do.31 Summarizing the composite result of New York and 
Printz, Justice Scalia concluded for the Court: 
We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to 
enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that 
Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the 
State’s officers directly. The Federal Government may neither issue 
directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor 
command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, 
to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. . . . [S]uch 
commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional 
system of dual sovereignty.32 
At its most basic level, Printz says that state executive functions, like 
legislative functions, may not be commandeered by federal exercise 
of the commerce power.33 This seems to speak precisely to the issue of 
federal coordination of first responders: the federal government may 
neither tell the states how to coordinate their first responders nor 
circumvent the states by coordinating them directly—at least not 
under the commerce power. 
Although the Court has limited Congress’s ability to regulate the 
states in Commerce Clause legislation, it has not done so in other 
areas. Most notably, in the context of the Civil War amendments, the 
Court has had no problem with Congress commandeering state 
functions such as voting.34 The difference in treatment arises because 
 
 28. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997). 
 29. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 30. Id. at 904. 
 31. See id. at 922 (“The Federal Government’s power would be augmented immeasurably 
and impermissibly if it were able to impress into its service—and at no cost to itself—the police 
officers of the 50 States.”). 
 32. Id. at 935. 
 33. The Court dealt only with limitations on the commerce power. See id. at 937 (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (describing why he believed the legislation was not even valid under the 
Commerce Clause standing alone). 
 34. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV; see, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 666 
(1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“When recognized state violations of federal constitutional 
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these amendments, unlike the Commerce Clause, specifically 
empower Congress to regulate the states as states.35 While the 
Commerce Clause simply authorizes regulation of commerce among 
the states, the Civil War amendments expressly deal with the states as 
sovereign entities.36 For example, when a state violates the principles 
of due process, Congress may use its Fourteenth Amendment power 
to regulate how the state behaves.37 The significance of this difference 
is that when a provision of the Constitution specifically defines the 
relationship between the federal government and the states in a given 
area of law, that provision supersedes the Tenth Amendment’s 
anticommandeering principle. 
II.  THE MILITIA CLAUSES 
In none of the cases interpreting the scope of the Tenth 
Amendment has the Court discussed the Militia Clauses.38 These 
clauses expressly grant Congress the power to regulate the states and 
their officers, so long as those officers are part of the militia. The 
Militia Clauses provide that: 
Congress shall have the power . . . 
 
standards have occurred, Congress is of course empowered by § 5 [of the Fourteenth 
Amendment] to take appropriate remedial measures to redress and prevent the wrongs.”); 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 311 (1966) (upholding Congress’s power under 
Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment to directly regulate and prohibit state voting laws that 
stood in the way of equal access to the polls, irrespective of race). 
 35. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”) (emphasis added); cf. Nat’l League of 
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842 (1976) (“[O]ur federal system of government imposes definite 
limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of the States as States by means 
of the commerce power.”). 
 36. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 218 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“States 
retain sovereignty despite the fact that Congress can regulate States qua States in certain limited 
circumstances.”). 
 37. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”); cf. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 518 
(2004) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment, unlike the Commerce Clause, enables 
Congress to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity). 
 38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15–16. Indeed, in none of the Tenth Amendment cases did 
the Court discuss whether the anticommandeering principle would apply at all as a limit on 
congressional powers other than the commerce power. The only times the clauses have been 
mentioned since the rise of a justiciable Tenth Amendment in Usery was in Perpich v. 
Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 345 (1990), in which the Court decided the 
constitutionality of sending National Guard troops abroad for training exercises. 
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[Clause 15:] To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the 
Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; 
[Clause 16:] To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the 
Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in 
the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, 
the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the 
Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress . . . .39 
Notice that Clause Sixteen “reserve[es] to the states” the 
“Appointment of Officers.”40 Thus, the militia is composed of state 
officers; yet Clause Fifteen allows Congress to call forth (i.e., 
commandeer) the militia not only for defense, but also to “execute 
the Laws of the Union.”41 Furthermore, the states themselves must 
carry out the training of the militia, but they can only do so 
“according to the discipline prescribed by Congress,” not according to 
their own independent judgment.42 
Were the Militia Clauses mere statutory provisions passed under 
the commerce power, the anticommandeering principle would clearly 
prohibit them.43 But, as part of the explicit text of the Constitution—
an affirmative grant of power to Congress—the Militia Clauses 
cannot be in any way limited by the Tenth Amendment, which by its 
own terms creates no limit on those powers expressly delegated to the 
United States.44 Some notable scholars have even pointed out that the 
Militia Clauses could be interpreted to lend considerable support to 
Printz’s anticommandeering holding: by expressly providing for the 
use of state militias to assist the federal government in executing 
federal law, this precludes the possibility of such commandeering in 
any other context not expressly delineated in the Constitution.45 
 
 39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15–16. 
 40. Id. cl. 16. 
 41. Id. cl. 15. 
 42. Id. cl. 16. 
 43. See supra notes 21–33 and accompanying text. 
 44. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”). 
 45. See, e.g., John C. Harrison, In the Beginning Are the States, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 173, 176 (1998) (“[T]he fact that Congress has that specific power suggests that it is all the 
power Congress has.”); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and 
Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2197 n.79 (1997) (“One might invoke expressio unius to say 
that the Constitution explicitly addresses how the states would assist in executing the laws of the 
land, and provides for use of the militia, precluding other possibilities . . . .”). 
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Insofar as the federal government is acting under the authority 
vested in it by the Militia Clauses, it may regulate the states and their 
officers. Therefore, if the individuals that make up first responders 
could be part of the militia, and if the goal of defeating terrorism falls 
under one or more of the exigencies listed under Clause Fifteen, then 
the federal government has a constitutional avenue to federalizing the 
problem of making first responders more effective. 
However, to determine whether first responders can be regulated 
under the Militia Clauses, one must first ask, what precisely is the 
militia? A corollary question is, who decides which individuals should 
be part of the militia and when they may be called into action? Both 
of these questions are addressed in this Part by examining the 
relevant history of the militia and the Militia Clauses. Section A 
explains the purpose underlying the inclusion of the Militia Clauses in 
the Constitution and examines how these clauses were implemented 
during the early years of the republic. Section B traces the 
development of the militia into the present-day National Guard, 
which is essential for understanding how both the federal government 
and the states concurrently exercise much of the constitutional 
authority to regulate the militia. Section C discusses when the federal 
government may “call forth” the militia into federal service. 
A. The Early Constitutional Militia 
Fears of federal tyranny through a standing army46 were assuaged 
by the constitutional militia concept; the militia was to be jointly 
operated by the states and the federal government.47 The Militia 
 
 46. It is important to understand the distinction between an army and a militia in order to 
understand the impetus for granting limited federal control over the militia: 
A militia unit was “a randomly conscripted cross-section of the general militia (all 
citizens capable of bearing arms) . . . serving alongside their families, friends, 
neighborhoods, classmates and fellow parishioners.” Army enlistees, “full-time 
soldiers who had sold themselves into virtual bondage to the government, were 
typically considered the dregs of society—men without land, homes, families, or 
principles.” 
David Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, History, and Constitutional Change, 99 MICH. 
L. REV. 588, 599–600 (2000) (quoting AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 53, 55 (1998)). 
 47. Alan Hirsch, The Militia Clauses of the Constitution and the National Guard, 56 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 919, 924 (1988). This was a significant advance over the situation under the Articles of 
Confederation, which prohibited any national standing army, instead requiring the Congress to 
ask the states to use their troops. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, para. 5 (1777). The 
Articles of Confederation provide in relevant part that: 
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Clauses “expressly struck a particular balance between federal 
interests and state autonomy in the military context.”48 Several 
compromises were necessary to achieve that balance. First, a time-
share plan of sorts was created for deciding when each sovereign 
could utilize the militia, with the federal government limited to use on 
an “as-needed” basis.49 Under Clause Fifteen, Congress can call forth 
the militia under only three discrete circumstances: “to execute the 
Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”50 
When not called into federal service, the militia would remain under 
the command of the states and their governors.51 
A second important constitutional compromise is found in 
Clause Sixteen. The federal government can set standards for the 
militia to ensure that the militia will be able to respond effectively in 
the event of national emergency, but training and the appointment of 
officers is left to the states.52 Two conflicting concerns drove this 
compromise: 
On the one hand, there was a widespread fear that a national 
standing Army posed an intolerable threat to individual liberty and 
to the sovereignty of the separate States, while on the other hand, 
there was a recognition of the danger of relying on inadequately 
 
The United States in Congress assembled shall have authority . . . to agree upon the 
number of land forces, and to make requisitions from each State for its quota, in 
proportion to the number of white inhabitants in such State; which requisition shall 
be binding; and thereupon, the Legislature of each State shall appoint the regimental 
officers, raise the men and cloth, arm and equip them in a soldier like manner, at the 
expence of the United States. . . . 
Id. 
 48. Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer 
State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1032 n.120 (1995). 
 49. See Perpich v. Dep’t of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 347 (1990) (noting the “traditional 
understanding” that the militia may only be called into federal service during emergency 
conditions). 
 50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. The ability to use the militia “to execute the laws of the 
Union” initially seems very broad, and during the debates of the Framers, Charles Clay and 
Patrick Henry expressed precisely that concern. Hirsch, supra note 47, at 929–30. However, 
supporters of the compromise, such as George Nicholas, explained that the use of the militia 
would only be “necessary in case the civilian law enforcement mechanisms were inadequate.” 
Id. at 930 n.72 (citing 3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES CONVENTIONS ON 
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 392 (1901) (remarks of George Nicholas)). 
 51. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 12 (1820). The president, as commander in 
chief, may only command the militia “when called into . . . actual Service” by Congress under 
Clause Fifteen. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
101805 06_BROOK.DOC 12/12/2005  3:16 PM 
1010 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:999 
trained soldiers as the primary means of providing for the common 
defense.53 
These compromises resulted in a militia that is coordinated day-to-
day by the states; however, the states must at all times54 ensure 
compliance with federal standards on organization, arms, and 
discipline. 
Significantly, the Constitution imposes no express substantive 
limitations on the makeup or potential functions of the militia 
generally, dealing instead with the formalistic division of power 
between sovereigns.55 Therefore, to discern the substance of what the 
militia is, one must look to its early history. 
The historical militia was very different from the present 
conception of a military force. The militia stood apart from the 
regular army because it was theoretically comprised of “citizen-
soldiers,” rather than professional ones;56 soldiering responsibilities 
were part time, leaving the citizens’ day-to-day lives undisturbed 
during times of tranquility. Given this theoretically light amount of 
responsibility, the prevailing view was that every citizen was 
potentially part of the militia.57 For instance, George Mason said, 
“Who are the Militia? They consist now of the whole people,58 except 
 
 53. Perpich, 496 U.S. at 340 (internal footnotes omitted) (discussing the history behind the 
constitutional militia as the basis for determining whether training the National Guard outside 
of the United States was a constitutionally permissible use of the militia by the federal 
government). 
 54. Congress’s powers to provide for the organization, arming, and discipline of the militia 
existed regardless of whether the militia was actually called into federal service under Clause 
Fifteen. 
 55. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 16: 
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing 
such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving 
to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of 
training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress . . . . 
 56. Hirsch, supra note 47, at 921. 
 57. See David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and the Second Amendment Revolution: 
Conjuring with the People, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 879, 897 (1996) “[T]he militia of the eighteenth 
century included every citizen . . . .”). 
 58. Of course, at the time, “the whole people” likely meant adult white males, as they were 
the only full citizens. See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE 
L.J. 637, 646–47 (1989) (discussing the Framers’ ideas of who should comprise the militia and its 
intended purpose). 
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a few public officers.”59 This view essentially carried the day when 
Congress took to organizing the militia. 
As between a militia comprised of soldiers and one comprised of 
citizens, Congress erred on the side of citizens: “[i]n place of a select 
contingent of young men, uniformly and periodically trained, 
Congress included every man, and imposed no requirements as to 
drills or musters.”60 The 1792 Uniform Militia Act enrolled into the 
militia every able-bodied white man between the ages of eighteen and 
forty-five.61 Although the militia was large, “as measures of national 
defense, they were worthless . . . . It imposed a duty on everyone, with 
the result that this duty was discharged by no one.”62 Instead of 
providing for the militia with the federal budget, Congress required 
each man to arm and equip himself at his own expense.63 Thus, 
although it was a topic of heated debate and mentioned in several 
constitutional provisions, the militia was incredibly disorganized and 
not particularly reliable. Amazingly, despite its obvious failings,64 the 
1792 Act remained the only permanent legislation under which the 
militia was organized for over a century.65 
The constitutionality of the 1792 Act and the laws passed by the 
states to confirm with it, imposing the duty to serve in the militia on 
virtually all citizens, has been firmly established. In the first Supreme 
Court case to deal with the militia explicitly, Houston v. Moore,66 the 
Court stated that the militia provisions “amount[ed] to a full 
execution of the powers conferred upon Congress by the 
Constitution.”67 In other words, because the incredibly broad 1792 
 
 59. 3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 425–26 (1901) (remarks of George Mason). 
 60. Fredrick B. Wiener, The Militia Clause of the Constitution, 54 HARV. L. REV. 181, 187 
(1940). 
 61. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271. Congress gave the states the ability to craft their 
own exemptions. Id. The authority to craft exemptions to the congressional directive was 
statutory, not constitutional. 
 62. Wiener, supra note 60, at 187. 
 63. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271. 
 64. Even the sponsor of the legislation was opposed to it in the final form in which it was 
passed. Wiener, supra note 60, at 186–87. The original proposal, introduced twice before the 
1792 Act, would have created a smaller force of young men with explicit training requirements. 
Id. 
 65. Id. at 187. Some variations upon it were passed, but none of them made any substantial 
changes to the provisions embodied in the 1792 Act. Id. 
 66. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 1 (1820). 
 67. Id. at 15. 
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Act was upheld, all citizens could be appropriately conscripted into 
the militia.68 
Houston also clarified the bounds between state and federal 
control of the militia. Pennsylvania had initiated a court-martial 
against a disobedient militiaman despite the existence of a separate 
federal courts-martial provision.69 The Court upheld Pennsylvania’s 
court-martial because it dealt with disobedience to orders of the 
governor, whereas the federal courts-martial provision only punished 
disobedience to orders of the president.70 By establishing the federal 
courts-martial provision, Congress did not create an exclusive venue 
for disciplining the militia.71 The Court thereby affirmed that, as 
stated in Clause Sixteen, the states retained substantial power to 
organize, arm, and even discipline the militia. 
The states, however, could not exercise their powers over the 
militia in a manner inconsistent with congressional mandates. In 1859, 
the governor of Massachusetts sought an advisory opinion from the 
state’s highest court on whether Massachusetts could, contrary to the 
1792 Act, include black men in its militia.72 The Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts held that the “power to determine who shall 
compose the militia [was] exclusive” and was vested in Congress.73 
Therefore, when the federal government drew a picture of what it 
wanted the militia to look like, the states had to stay within the lines. 
This historical analysis sheds light on the way that the 
constitutional division of authority over the militia between the states 
and the federal government has developed. At all times, during war 
or during peace, Congress has the exclusive power to say who among 
the citizenry can or must participate in the militia. The Constitution 
does not limit Congress’s power, and the states cannot contradict 
federal requirements. 
B. The Modern National Guard 
1. Transforming the Militia into the National Guard.  As 
mentioned above, the basic provisions of the 1792 Uniform Militia 
 
 68. See Wiener, supra note 60, at 187 (“[The 1792 Act] imposed a duty on everyone . . . .”). 
 69. Houston, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 2–3. 
 70. Id. at 57. 
 71. Id. at 28–29. 
 72. In re Opinion of the Justices, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 614, 614 (1859). 
 73. In re Opinion of the Justices, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) at 618. 
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Act remained the sole guidance for the states for over a century. It 
was not until the Dick Act of 190374 that Congress gave the militia a 
much-needed overhaul. The Dick Act represented the first real 
assertion of federal power to fund and regulate the militia.75 Fittingly, 
given the newly increased federal role, the militia was officially 
renamed the National Guard.76 “This ‘National Guard’ represented 
the fruition of a process that had been underway from the beginning 
of the nation: the evolution of the militia from the whole citizenry 
into a select, organized military institution.”77 Section 3 of the Dick 
Act required that the National Guard be organized like the regular 
army within five years.78 Perhaps the most significant change 
implemented by the Dick Act was its termination of compulsory 
militia service; participation in the new National Guard was 
voluntary.79 
The transformation of the militia into the modern National 
Guard did not occur through the Dick Act alone, and it was hardly 
transformed overnight. Further significant change occurred via the 
Act of 1908,80 which provided that when the National Guard was 
called into service, it would be available to serve “either within or 
without the territory of the United States.”81 This contradicted the 
common belief that Clause Fifteen only permitted use of the militia 
within the territory of the United States.82 
 
 74. 32 Stat. 775, 775, ch. 196 (1903). 
 75. Hirsch, supra note 47, at 944–45. 
 76. Id. Even though the militia as a whole was not so named until 1903, it was only shortly 
after the Civil War that “select bodies of men . . . became known as National Guards,” though 
they typically devoted their time to “drills, ‘showy parades in harlequin uniforms,’ and, with 
distressing regularity, to strike duty.” Wiener, supra note 60, at 191 (quoting FEDERAL AID IN 
DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES, S. DOC. NO. 67-263, at 205 (1922)). 
 77. Hirsch, supra note 47, at 945. 
 78. Wiener, supra note 60, at 195 n.76. In addition to organizing itself like the army, the 
National Guard’s training was to be provided by regular army officers. Id. However, due to the 
compromise of Clause Sixteen, training was left to the states. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 16. 
Accordingly, such training only took place upon application by a state’s governor. Wiener, supra 
note 60, at 195–96. 
 79. Hirsch, supra note 47, at 945. Interestingly, the Dick Act and those that have followed 
it did not change the broad definition of militia, specifying that it “consists of all able-bodied 
males at least 17 years of age and . . . under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a 
declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States.” 10 U.S.C. § 311 (2000). 
 80. 35 Stat. 400, § 4; see Wiener, supra note 60, at 197 (“In that year, [the Dick Act] was 
amended and strengthened.”). 
 81. Perpich v. Dep’t of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 343 (1990) (citing 35 Stat. 400, § 4). 
 82. See infra Part III.A. 
101805 06_BROOK.DOC 12/12/2005  3:16 PM 
1014 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:999 
Controversy over the potential use of the National Guard 
outside the territory of the United States came to a head in 1916, on 
the eve of America’s entry into World War I.83 Congress responded 
with the National Defense Act,84 which provided for the Guard to be 
“federalized,” completely transforming it from the earlier conception 
of a state militia.85 The Guard “was made available for service 
abroad” and “was to receive federal pay for armory drills and 
administrative work as well as for field encampments.”86 Numerous 
other provisions gave the federal government substantial control over 
the National Guard, including over training and the appointment of 
officers, despite the Militia Clauses’ express reservation of those 
powers to the states.87 Significantly, the Guard began taking a dual 
oath—”to support the Nation as well as the State, to obey not only 
the governor but also the president.”88 A Note in the Harvard Law 
Review at the time of the National Defense Act took the position that 
by taking a federal oath, members of the National Guard expressly 
waived “their constitutional right to object to a draft for other than 
the constitutionally specified purposes . . . The net result [was] that 
the old sort of militia, known to the Constitution, [was] to be done 
away with.”89 
Then came World War I. Rather than attempting to call forth the 
National Guard under the Militia Clauses, Congress drafted the 
Guard into federal service.90 Through this action the Guard became, 
for constitutional purposes, part of the regular army, and therefore 
there was no constitutional infirmity in sending the Guard to fight 
abroad. Unfortunately, the exigencies of war required the established 
Guard divisions, each hailing from its own state, to be broken up, 
thereby removing the inherent advantage in having troops that train 
together go into battle together.91 Most distressingly, the draft 
inadvertently caused every member of the Guard that was drafted to 
 
 83. Wiener, supra note 60, at 199. 
 84. Act of June 3, 1916, ch. 134, 39 Stat. 166 (1916). 
 85. Wiener, supra note 60, at 200. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 201. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Note, 30 HARV. L. REV. 176, 178–79 (1916). 
 90. Wiener, supra note 60, at 203. The power to draft the National Guard into the regular 
army was upheld by the Supreme Court in the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 366–67 
(1918). 
 91. Weiner, supra note 60, at 203. 
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be discharged from the militia.92 The end of the war left the states 
without a militia force to take care of domestic problems such as 
labor strikes.93 Thus, the draft “virtually destroyed the Guard as an 
effective organization.”94 
In the years after World War I, the National Guard was again 
reconstituted and, thanks to the lessons learned during and after the 
war, further federalized. Among the first reforms was the 
arrangement of the Guard into national divisions, rather than on a 
statewide basis.95 The unintended problem of permanent discharge 
from the militia upon draft into federal service was corrected by 
statute.96 These reforms culminated in 1933, when the National Guard 
was officially reconstituted as a reserve component of the United 
States Army.97 This obviated the need to “draft” the National Guard 
anytime Congress’s Clause Fifteen powers were insufficient to call 
forth the militia.98 Because Guard divisions could be called into 
service directly, rather than as individuals drafted separately, the 
problem of dismantled units was solved. 
“Since 1933 all persons who have enlisted in a State National 
Guard unit have simultaneously enlisted in the National Guard of the 
United States.”99 The Supreme Court has interpreted the current 
status of the Guard as one of “dual enlistment,” meaning that the 
Guard is part of the army when called into federal service but is 
otherwise part of the militia.100 
2. Distinguishing the National Guard from the Militia.  Although 
both the army and the militia may be deployed to combat national 
emergencies, only the militia can be used to resolve domestic disputes 
within a state,101 and only the army can be used for international 
 
 92. Id. at 203–04. 
 93. Id. at 205–06. 
 94. See Perpich v. Dep’t of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 345 (1990) (detailing the development of 
the National Guard). 
 95. Wiener, supra note 60, at 207. 
 96. Id. at 206. 
 97. Id. at 208. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Perpich, 496 U.S. at 346. 
 100. Id. at 345–46. 
 101. See Jay S. Bybee, Insuring Domestic Tranquility: Lopez, Federalization of Crime, and 
the Forgotten Role of the Domestic Violence Clause, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 43 (1997) (noting 
that only upon application by the governor may federal troops assist in the state’s handling of 
domestic violence). Aside from the possible constitutional prohibition on the unwelcome use of 
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disputes requiring action beyond the territory of the United States.102 
The dual enlistment of the National Guard thus gives it the breadth 
necessary to deal with emergencies at the local, national, and even 
international levels. 
Although the National Guard may be used for any purpose, its 
creation did not dissolve the regular standing army; likewise, the 
existence of the Guard does not prevent the states from creating their 
own militias.103 Interestingly, the broad enabling language of the 1792 
Act did not change significantly with the creation of the Guard via the 
Dick Act, which defines the militia as: 
[C]onsist[ing] of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age 
and . . . under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a 
declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States and 
of female citizens of the United States who are members of the 
National Guard.104 
Actually, the additional possibility of female members of the militia 
makes the present statute even broader than that created in 1792. The 
Dick Act, however, distinguished between the two types of militia: 
“(1) the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard . . . ; 
and (2) the unorganized militia, which consists of the members of the 
militia who are not members of the National Guard . . . .”105 This 
statutory definition, which includes most adult men who have not 
volunteered for the National Guard, yields little, if any, help in 
understanding the nature of the unorganized militia. 
Even today, virtually any individual could constitutionally be 
called into service of state or federal government as part of the 
militia; Congress need only act to organize what is currently defined 
 
federal troops to deal with ordinary intrastate violence, the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 clearly 
prohibits any use of the Army for civilian law enforcement. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000) (originally 
enacted as Posse Comitatus Act, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 152 (1878)) (prohibiting the use of “any 
part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws”). 
 102. See, e.g., Wiener, supra note 60, at 190 (“When the Mexican War broke out, the militia 
was unavailable because of the constitutional limitations; service in Mexico was no part of 
repelling invasions or of suppressing insurrections.”). 
 103. The legislation currently on the books both creates the National Guard and allows for 
the creation of unorganized militia; the latter provision has been used by a number of states to 
create emergency response teams. See 10 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2000); infra notes 108–11 and 
accompanying text. 
 104. 10 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2000). 
 105. Id. § 311(b). 
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as unorganized.106 Even without congressional direction, the 
significance of the statutory “unorganized militia” goes beyond the 
occasional radical separatist’s foray into what he believes to be the 
militia.107 At least twenty-four states have utilized the congressional 
authorization for unorganized militia to create state guards.108 These 
state guards essentially train themselves and typically serve without 
pay when they are not called into active duty by their governors, even 
paying for their own weapons and uniforms—not unlike the militia 
organized in 1792.109 The state guards generally fill the role of 
community servants rather than soldiers, thanks in large part to the 
National Guard carrying the burden of most defensive activities.110 
Despite their noncombat role, the members of the state guards are 
acutely aware of their constitutional role as the traditional militia and 
are prepared to serve the president, if so called forth.111 
 
 106. See William L. Shaw, The Interrelationship of the United States Army and the National 
Guard, 31 MIL. L. REV. 39, 44 (1966) (“The term ‘Militia’ has had at least two different 
meanings. One refers to all citizens and resident aliens who may be called in an emergency. 
These comprise the unorganized militia . . . .”). 
 107. Until recently, the notion of unorganized militia did not receive much attention. The 
recent interest derives from the nongovernmental “Militia Movement” or the “New Militia.” 
See Williams, supra note 57 (using the term “Militia Movement” in the article’s title and 
throughout to refer to modern civilian groups that fancy themselves militia). These are armed 
paramilitary groups comprised of private citizens that fancy themselves constitutionally 
protected militia. See Anti-Defamation League: Militia History and Law FAQ, at 
http://www.militia-watchdog.org/faq1.asp (last visited July 19, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal). These groups have given militias “a bad reputation in the news and entertainment 
media lately. They are usually portrayed as little better than outlaws—either home-grown 
terrorists, or paranoid gun-nuts ready to make war on the ‘New World Order.’” The Real 
Militia, 23 ENGINEER UPDATE (1999), available at http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/cepa/ 
pubs/aug99/story17.htm. The debate over the New Militia illustrates that the unorganized militia 
remains undefined by Congress. 
 108. Id. Express congressional approval of these organizations comes from 32 U.S.C. § 109, 
which states in part that “[i]n addition to its National Guard, if any, a State or Territory, Puerto 
Rico, the Virgin Islands, or the District of Columbia may, as provided by its laws, organize and 
maintain defense forces.” 32 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2000). 
 109. The Real Militia, supra note 107. 
 110. About the Stage Guard Association of the United States, Who We Are, at 
http://www.sgaus.org/aboutSG.htm (last visited July 19, 2005) (“While in training status [state 
guards] also serve civil government and community organizations. This leads to rescue and relief 
roles for [state guards] and for all sorts of community service.”) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal). 
 111. See id. (“[B]y the U.S. Constitution, Militia is to defend against invasions and 
insurrection and to enforce the laws.”). 
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C. Historical Limits on Calling Forth the Militia 
This Section addresses what precisely is encompassed by the 
power to “call forth” the militia under Clause Fifteen. One of the 
earliest and most famous instances in which the militia was called 
forth was the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794.112 President Washington 
used the 1792 Act to assemble the militia of four states—Maryland, 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia—and personally led them in 
a successful campaign to reinstate order in the face of hundreds of 
recalcitrant Western Pennsylvanians.113 Notably, Washington did not 
classify the actions of the Western Pennsylvania rebels as an 
“insurrection” to invoke the 1792 Act, but instead used the Act’s 
provision allowing the militia to “execute the laws of the Union.”114 In 
classifying his order as an action to execute the laws of the Union, 
Washington triggered a set of procedural formalities not present in 
the insurrection classification.115 Given the lingering fear of 
presidential control over a standing army, it is likely that Washington 
deliberately chose the classification that carried with it the greatest 
number of checks and balances to reassure the people that the 
president could be trusted as commander in chief.116 Whatever the 
reason for the decision to observe procedural formalities, it seems 
relatively evident that the Whiskey Rebellion could have been just as 
easily classified as an “insurrection.”117 Significantly, President 
Washington’s decision to follow rigid procedural rules did not create 
a lasting precedent followed by subsequent presidents, perhaps 
because the fear of tyranny by the executive quickly dissipated. 
 
 112. Wiener, supra note 60, at 187–88. 
 113. FREDERICK T. WILSON, FEDERAL AID IN DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES: 1787–1903, S. 
DOC. NO. 57-209, at 33–42 (2d Sess. 1903). This was the “only campaign in American history 
ever led by the President in person.” Wiener, supra note 60, at 187–88. 
 114. Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, Emergency Power and the Militia Acts, 114 YALE L.J. 149, 
161 n.46 (2004). 
 115. See id. at 160–61 (detailing how Washington first “sought and received certification 
from Supreme Court Justice James Wilson,” then “issued a proclamation commanding the 
insurgents to disperse,” and finally “assembled militiamen from four states . . . who eventually 
quelled the threat”). 
 116. See ROBERT W. COAKLEY, THE ROLE OF FEDERAL MILITARY FORCES IN DOMESTIC 
DISORDERS, 1789–1878, at 67–68 (“By his actions in the Whiskey Rebellion, Washington had 
apparently dissipated the fears expressed in 1792 that these powers could not with safety be 
entrusted to the President of the United States.” (internal quotation omitted)). 
 117. See Wiener, supra note 60, at 187 (referring to this incident, which is typically called the 
“Whiskey Rebellion,” as “the Whiskey Insurrection”). 
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The War of 1812 marked the first occasion that required a 
significant mobilization of the militia, and several interesting events 
resulted.118 Although the sudden appearance of British troops on 
American soil would, for most people, clearly constitute an 
“invasion,” “the Governor of Massachusetts refused to honor the 
president’s call for militia, and was sustained in his refusal by the 
Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth.”119 In that opinion, 
the court stated its belief that the governor had the responsibility to 
decide whether to comply with a federal order calling forth the militia 
based upon his determination of whether the situation fell into one of 
the three exigencies listed in Clause Fifteen and its corollary enabling 
acts.120 
Fifteen years later, in Martin v. Mott,121 the United States 
Supreme Court had the opportunity to weigh in on the issue of who 
decides when one of the three exigencies of Clause Fifteen is 
present.122 Justice Story wrote: 
We are all of opinion, that the authority to decide whether the 
exigency has arisen, belongs exclusively to the President, and that 
his decision is conclusive upon all other persons. We think that this 
construction necessarily results from the nature of the power 
itself . . . [which] is to be exercised upon sudden emergencies, upon 
great occasions of state, and under circumstances which may be vital 
to the existence of the Union. A prompt and unhesitating obedience 
to orders is indispensable to the complete attainment of the object. 
The service is a military service, and the command of a military 
nature; and in such cases, every delay, and every obstacle to an 
efficient and immediate compliance, necessarily tend to jeopard [sic] 
the public interests.123 
Today, 180 years later, Martin remains the only Supreme Court 
decision on the president’s authority to call forth the militia under 
Clause Fifteen and the enabling statutes.124 Thus, the president has the 
 
 118. Id. at 188 (“[W]e raised over 527,000 men in all . . . .”). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Opinion of the Justices, 8 Mass. (7 Tyng) 548 (1812). 
 121. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827). 
 122. Id. at 28. 
 123. Id. at 30. 
 124. Relatively recently, the Court was once again poised to address the limits of the 
constitutional power to call forth the militia in Perpich v. Department of Defense. 496 U.S. 334 
(1990). The case involved a governor’s refusal to send the state’s national guard abroad for 
training exercises under the theory that the authority to train remained with the states so long as 
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exclusive power to decide whether a situation rises to the level of 
insurrection or invasion.125 
Out of the War of 1812 came a different but nonetheless 
important lesson, one involving the territorial limitations on 
deployment of the militia. The New York Militia was ordered to cross 
the Niagara River into Canada to engage the British.126 The militia 
refused to cross the river, being “unanimously of opinion that ‘to 
repel Invasions’ meant just that, and that it did not involve battling 
the British in Canada.”127 This set a long-standing precedent for 
militias to refuse to leave the territory of the United States. Over 
three decades later, during the Mexican-American War, the militia 
was deemed “unavailable because of the constitutional limitations.”128 
Even though it did not come from either the text of the Constitution 
or the decision of any court, this understanding that the Militia 
Clauses only permit the militia to operate within the territory of the 
United States was de facto constitutional law.129 
In sum, as far as deciding when an exigency exists sufficient to 
bring the militia within federal control under Clause Fifteen, the 
decisionmaking authority rests solely with the president and is not 
 
the militia had not been called into federal service. Id. at 336–38. Accordingly, a central issue 
could have been whether the National Guard was constitutionally called forth into federal 
service. However, the Court merely acknowledged the potential limitations on calling forth the 
militia for training exercises abroad given the longstanding history of militia use solely for 
defense purposes. The Court avoided that issue by recognizing the dual status of the Guard, and 
noting that, when called into federal service, the Guard is part of the army and not subject to the 
limitations of Clause Fifteen. See id. at 347: 
The Governor’s attack on the Montgomery Amendment relies in part on the 
traditional understanding that “the Militia” can only be called forth for three limited 
purposes that do not encompass either foreign service or nonemergency conditions, 
and in part on the express language in the second Militia Clause reserving to the 
States “the Authority of training the Militia.” The Governor does not, however, 
challenge the authority of Congress to create a dual enlistment program. 
 125. “Note that Congress cannot itself call forth the militias but may only ‘provide for 
calling forth the Militia.’ Someone else (i.e., the president) must call forth the militia.” Steven 
G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE 
L.J. 541, 586 n.173 (1994) (citation omitted). The president’s ability to call forth the militia is 
dependent upon Congress providing some statutory basis for having a militia in the first place. 
Id. at 585–86. 
 126. Wiener, supra note 60, at 189. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 190. 
 129. See Hirsch, supra note 47, at 932 (“[T]he Constitution made the militia a defensive 
force only . . . .”); see also Perpich, 496 U.S. at 342 (“Moreover, the legislative history of [the 
Dick] Act indicates that Congress contemplated that the services of the organized militia would 
‘be rendered only upon the soil of the United States or of its Territories.’” (citation omitted)). 
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subject to judicial review. Furthermore, the Posse Comitatus Act, 
normally a limit on the domestic use of military personnel, does not 
apply to militias.130 The power to use the militia once called forth, 
however, is limited by the historical understanding that the militia 
cannot be used outside of the territory of the United States. 
III.  MODERNIZING THE  
MILITIA TO RESPOND TO TERRORIST ATTACKS 
This Part argues that, consistent with the Constitution and 
historical practice, the Militia Clauses can be used to deal effectively 
with today’s most important national security threat: terrorism. First, 
it addresses whether Clause Fifteen can be appropriately construed to 
permit the president to call forth the militia to combat terrorism.131 
Second, it considers whether the militia, traditionally a fighting force, 
may legitimately include first responders and engage in humanitarian 
aid.132 Finally, this Note examines the practical issues that would arise 
if Congress adopted this proposed mechanism for federalizing the 
first response to acts of terrorism.133 
A. The Authority to Call Forth the Militia to Combat Terrorism 
In considering whether the Militia Clauses can provide a way to 
federalize the first response to acts of terrorism, the first step is to 
 
 130. The current language of the Act succinctly provides that: 
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the 
Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force 
as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000). A posse comitatus is “[a] group of citizens who are called together to 
help the sheriff keep the peace or conduct rescue operations.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1200 
(8th ed. 2004). The Act notably does not preclude the militia from acting as a posse comitatus or 
otherwise executing the laws. The same cannot be said when the National Guard acts under 
federal control. Because of the dual enlistment system, whenever members of the National 
Guard are called into federal service, they are instantly placed on the federal payroll and act as 
members of the regular army, temporarily relinquishing their status as members of the state 
militia. Perpich, 496 U.S. at 347. Therefore, insofar as the militia may be called forth to execute 
the laws of the union, the National Guard is generally excluded. 18 U.S.C. § 831(e) (2000) 
(providing the only congressional exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, dealing with the event 
of an emergency involving nuclear materials). The traditional militia therefore remains free to 
do whatever it is called forth to do, without regard for the traditional limitations upon military 
actors under federal control. 
 131. See infra Part III.A. 
 132. See infra Part III.B. 
 133. See infra Part III.C. 
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determine whether the Militia Clauses permit the “calling forth” of 
the militia in the event of terrorism; that is, whether combating 
particular acts of terrorism may be classified as executing the laws of 
the union, suppressing insurrection, or repelling invasions.134 As noted 
in Part II.C, the president has “exclusive” authority to decide whether 
one of the exigencies has arisen, and “his decision is conclusive upon 
all other persons.”135 Therefore, although this Section argues that 
terrorism is a valid exigency under Clause Fifteen, it is merely an 
exercise in rhetoric because the president’s decision is not subject to 
review.136 
Despite that qualification, combating terrorism should be viewed 
as either insurrection or invasion.137 An invasion is simply “the act of 
invading, especially the entrance of an armed force into a territory to 
conquer.”138 Insurrection is “the act or an instance of revolting 
esp[ecially] violently against civil or political authority or against an 
established government.”139 These two concepts have one common 
theme: an attack on the established government and an attempt to 
 
 134. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (stating the power of Congress “[t]o provide for calling 
forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions”). 
 135. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 30 (1827). This decision still stands as good law 
for calling forth the militia despite subsequent developments on the question of when the 
president and state executives may declare a state of martial law. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 
(4 Wall.) 2, 124–28 (1866) (holding that the president’s discretion to implement martial law 
during time of war is not unfettered and may be subject to judicial review). Because calling forth 
the militia is primarily a military decision, it remains within the president’s direction as 
commander in chief. The imposition of martial law, on the other hand, directly affects the lives 
of citizens by removing their access to the ordinary channels of due process. Sterling v. 
Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 404 (1932) (“If it be assumed that the Governor was entitled to 
declare a state of insurrection and to bring military force to the aid of civil authority, the proper 
use of that power in this instance was to maintain the federal court . . . and not to attempt to 
override it . . . .”); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2650 (2004) (“[T]he threats to 
military operations posed by a basic system of independent review are not so weighty as to 
trump a citizen’s core rights to challenge meaningfully the Government’s case and to be heard 
by an impartial adjudicator.”). 
 136. Martin, 25 U.S. at 30. 
 137. The third exigency, “to execute the laws,” is most likely inapposite to this situation 
because of the nature of response to terrorist activity, which primarily involves emergency 
response rather than law enforcement. Even insofar as first responders may be called upon to 
execute the laws, this exigency likely would not provide for federal intervention because the 
militia may only be called forth to execute the laws if the laws could not be executed “in the 
ordinary course of judicial proceedings or by [a federal] marshal.” Wiener, supra note 60 at 187. 
 138. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2000). An 
alternative definition is a “large-scale onset of something injurious or harmful, such as a 
disease,” but that is too broad to be useful here. Id. 
 139. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF LAW (1996). 
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change the way of life for the people in the attacked society. 
Similarly, terrorism is an attack on the citizenry in an attempt to 
undermine the established government while interrupting daily life. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as “the 
unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to 
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any 
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”140 
Rather than using regiments of soldiers, however, terrorism uses acts 
of violence to strike terror in the collective psyche of a people, 
thereby altering the people’s way of life and the government’s 
policies.141 Because an act of terrorism seeks to accomplish the same 
ends as invasion or insurrection through similar (violent) means, 
terrorism should be viewed as a form of insurrection or invasion.142 
The disjunctive is used here—”invasion or insurrection”—
because a terrorist attack may be one or the other depending on the 
source: insurrection comes from within; invasion from without. 
Terrorism, however, can come from anywhere. If insurrection 
constitutes revolting against established government, then certainly 
domestically-based acts like those of Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma 
City would qualify—committing an act of violence and “hoping to 
spark an insurrection.”143 
Whether the terrorist acts of noncitizens constitute insurrection, 
even though the violence originates from within the United States, is 
less clear. However, because the United States is a relatively open 
country with millions of immigrants, it must be the case that those 
immigrants, whether legal or illegal, are subject to the general 
authority of the government. For any individual living in the United 
States, terrorist or otherwise, the United States is that individual’s 
government, irrespective of whether that person’s presence in the 
 
 140. General Functions, 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(l) (2004). 
 141. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 
138 (“The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a person or an organized group 
against people or property with the intention of intimidating or coercing societies or 
governments, often for ideological or political reasons.”). 
 142. The Supreme Court, though not directly weighing in on the issue of whether an act of 
terrorism is the same as an act of invasion or insurrection, recently mentioned both insurrection 
and terrorism in tandem throughout its 2004 opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. 124 S. Ct. 2633, 
2664 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (mentioning that statutes criminalizing warmaking and 
adherence to the enemy are akin to statutes criminalizing insurrection or rebellion). 
 143. Martin A. Lee, Oy McVeigh, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN (June 11, 2001), available at 
http://www.sfbg.com/reality/27.html (describing the atrocity committed by Timothy McVeigh on 
April 19, 1995, when he blew up the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City). 
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country is merely an attempt to infiltrate the target. Accordingly, 
when such an individual tries to use violence to change the policies of 
the government and alter the way of life of fellow inhabitants, that 
individual is engaging in an act of revolt against the government. On 
the other hand, a terrorist attack by a nonresident of the United 
States constitutes an invasion. Al-Qaida, for example, is a foreign-
based terrorist organization144 with a goal of destroying the United 
States and supplanting it with an Islamist Caliphate: a goal of 
conquest.145 Therefore, when Al-Qaida uses terrorism within the 
borders of the United States, this is fundamentally an act of invasion. 
The goal is the same as traditional invasion; the only difference is 
that, given the current supremacy of the United States’ military 
forces, terrorism is more likely to achieve the goal of conquest than 
outright invasion by conventional means. 
The president should be able to exercise his authority to call 
forth the militia to combat terrorism within the United States. 
Terrorism may be an invasion when the threat comes from outside 
the territory of the United States, and it may be an insurrection if the 
threat comes from within. Section B considers the means available to 
combat both threats through the militia. 
B. The Appropriate Use of First Responders in the Militia 
The constitutional reach of the Militia Clauses is extensive: 
Congress may enroll the entire citizenry in the militia if it so desires.146 
By incorporating first responders into the militia, they can receive the 
federal guidance necessary to effectively respond to a terrorist 
attack.147 However, their response will not involve any sort of 
traditional combat. This Section simply argues that the Constitution 
does not prohibit enlisting the militia to carry out first-responder 
activities for three reasons: (1) the militia were not historically limited 
to engaging in combat, (2) the nature of the other branches of the 
military has changed, and (3) the “fight” against terrorism cannot be 
 
 144. COUNTERTERRORISM OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL 
TERRORISM 2003, 131–32 (2004), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 
31912.pdf. 
 145. Al-Qaida Terrorist Group Profile, at http://library.nps.navy.mil/home/tgp/qaida.htm 
(last visited May 7, 2005) (“[The] [c]urrent goal is to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate 
throughout the world . . . .”) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 146. See supra notes 53–68 and accompanying text. 
 147. See supra note 4. 
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won through combat, but instead requires immediate and effective 
humanitarian response. Together, these reasons support a flexible 
conception of the Militia Clauses as enabling Congress to conscript 
the average United States citizen to take whatever action is necessary 
to preserve the nation. 
First, although evidence regarding the noncombat activities of 
the earliest constitutional militia is not extensive, state militias have 
served in both combat and noncombat capacities. During the early 
post-Colonial period, the militia was the primary means by which a 
state governor could exert force to maintain order.148 Even in the 
country’s largest cities, nothing resembling a professional police force 
appeared until nearly fifty years after independence.149 Because the 
early militia often served police functions, even a purely originalist 
perspective would allow the militia to perform police functions today. 
Additionally, the unorganized militia that comprises state guards 
today is entirely a noncombat force, dedicated primarily to 
emergency response.150 
Second, the other branches of the United States military have 
always had noncombat roles, but, importantly, as these branches’ 
tactical capabilities have grown, so too have their noncombat 
activities.151 For example, the army has had a medical department 
since 1775.152 Though not engaged in combat, battlefield doctors that 
care for injured soldiers are full members of the military, not merely 
civilians accompanying the military. Today, the responsibilities of 
military doctors go well beyond simply caring for injured soldiers and 
include humanitarian missions around the world.153 Additionally, the 
 
 148. 5 J. ELLIOT, supra note 59, at 445 (remarks of Roger Sherman). 
 149. See Levinson, supra note 58, at 646 (“[T]he development of a professional police force 
(even within large American cities) was still at least a half century away at the end of the 
colonial period.”). 
 150. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 151. The army even engaged in standard law enforcement activities in the South during 
Reconstruction. Vladeck, supra note 114, at 168. However, it was anger over the army’s role in 
law enforcement that led to the passage of the Posse Comitatus Act. Id. 
 152. Mary C. Gillet, The Army Medical Department, 1775–1818, available at http://history. 
amedd.army.mil/booksdocs/rev/gillett1/. 
 153.  E.g., Kathleen T. Rhem, Military Doctors Discuss Humanitarian Assistance, ARMED 
FORCES NETWORK, at http://www.armedforces.net/Detailed/2275.html (Sep. 14, 2004) (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal). 
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noncombat role of the military extends beyond medicine into fields 
functionally similar to those occupied by first responders.154 
Third, the current threat of terrorism is one against which a 
historical militia could not adequately defend. The quintessential 
militia member, in the historical context, is the citizen-soldier—the 
farmer who, when called, puts down the hoe and takes up the 
musket.155 The nature of warfare has changed dramatically since the 
eighteenth century, resulting in an abandonment of the concept of a 
citizen-soldier in favor of professional troops.156 Thus, if the citizen-
solder concept were to be revitalized in the twenty-first century at all, 
its character would have to change dramatically as well. 
The Constitution is clear that Congress would be acting within its 
Militia Clause authority if it required all citizens to purchase 
weapons, attend regular training sessions, and even kill or be killed if 
called into duty by the president.157 Such measures, though, are 
unlikely to be effective because of the clandestine nature of terrorists, 
who cannot be fought in the same way as conventional soldiers. A 
historical militia would not have been useful against surprise attacks 
in Oklahoma City and New York, nor would it be effective against 
the types of attacks anticipated by terrorism experts. As the enemy 
changes, so too must the response. Today, the citizen-soldier is not 
the farmer who drops the hoe for the musket, but instead the 
virologist who leaves the lab to investigate a terrorist attack involving 
a suspected biological agent. 
The more damage done by a terrorist attack, the more effective 
the terrorists, and the closer they get to accomplishing their goal of 
changing governmental policy or, ultimately, destroying a society’s 
way of life. Once the attack has been carried out by a terrorist cell, 
the only force that can be effective is a humanitarian one. Unlike 
traditional war, in which the success of battles is measured by the 
numbers of personnel and equipment lost, the success or failure of a 
terrorist operation is often all or nothing: typically, the terrorist act 
 
 154. See, e.g., 249th Engineer Battalion, United States Army Prime Power, available at 
http://249en.belvoir.army.mil/capabs/en249.htm (describing the battalion’s mission as to 
“[d]eploy to generate and distribute prime electrical power in support of warfighting, stability 
and support operations, and disaster relief operations”). 
 155. See supra notes 56–73 and accompanying text. 
 156. In 1901, President Theodore Roosevelt declared that “[o]ur militia law is obsolete and 
worthless,” and, not surprisingly, the Dick Act followed on the heels of this comment. Wiener, 
supra note 60 at 194–95. 
 157. See supra note 2 (quoting the Militia Clauses of Article I). 
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either succeeds (for example, the plane crashes) or fails (the plane 
does not crash). Numerous federal agencies, such as the Central 
Intelligence Agency and the FBI, are currently working around the 
clock to prevent further terrorist strikes.158 Their efforts might yield 
little or no reduction in the damage toll, however, if they fail to 
discover and reach the particular terrorist cell.159 There is typically no 
long-fought battle; the entire attack lasts but a moment. 
Once a terrorist attack has begun, the best way to “win” is 
through damage control: the emergency response by first responders 
is the best, and perhaps the only, way to combat terrorism. Using a 
first-responder militia would reduce the damage caused by a terrorist 
attack. By contrast, the traditional conception of the musket-bearing 
militia (even equipped with modern arms) would have little, if any, 
power to reduce the harm. Accordingly, when deciding who to call 
forth to combat terrorism, the president would not only be justified in 
calling first responders, he would be gravely mistaken not to do so. 
C. Turning Theory into Practice 
Establishing a legal basis for federalizing first responders and 
actually implementing such a program are different matters. The 
practical steps that need to be taken before first responders can be 
treated as part of the militia include congressional action providing 
for the organization of first responders and development of a plan for 
federal deployment of first responders. 
Under its Clause Sixteen power to organize the militia, Congress 
can precisely designate that specific types of personnel, such as 
doctors and engineers, be part of each state’s militia, so that the 
militia is ready to respond to a variety of possible terrorist attacks. 
Congress has never used its full Clause Sixteen power to precisely 
specify who is in the militia, but this lack of precedent should not stop 
Congress from defining the militia in a way that includes first 
 
 158. Statement of John S. Pistole, executive assistant director, 
counterterrorism/counterintelligence, FBI, Before the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States (April 14, 2004), at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress04/ 
pistole041404.htm (last visited May 7, 2005) (noting the FBI’s work “around the clock” and in 
conjunction with numerous intelligence partners to prevent terrorism) (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal). 
 159. This is an oversimplification of sorts, designed around the notion that each terrorist act 
is a self-contained event, such as one bomb, or one virus. 
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responders. Such a step would depart from Congress’s historical, 
broad enabling acts—but those acts have been criticized.160 
Although Clause Sixteen reserves the actual training and 
appointment of officers for the states, Congress may dictate the 
discipline for such training. Using experts in FEMA and the Center 
for Disease Control (CDC), Congress could develop a specific 
regimen for the states to implement. Congress could also provide a 
mechanism for the states to use such federal experts voluntarily to 
train first responders, perhaps providing monetary incentives to 
encourage states to do so. Additionally, by taking an active role in the 
appointment of officers, Congress would approach full federalization 
of first responders under the Militia Clauses. States would retain the 
right to appoint individual officers, but Congress could designate 
specific officer positions and dictate qualifications for each office.161 
Once a militia is organized, Clause Fifteen gives Congress, and 
by extension the president, the power to call it forth under any one of 
the three listed exigencies.162 If a terrorist attack occurred, the 
president should call forth the first responder militia. As commander 
in chief, the president could effectively coordinate first responders 
from all parts of the nation to efficiently respond to an act of 
terrorism. This course of action creates the nation’s best chance of 
averting disaster in a terrorist attack through uniform training and 
federal coordination. Construing the militia in this way would turn a 
form of historical military service into public service—a concept far 
more palatable to the typical firefighter, police officer, or doctor who 
might be called forth to serve the national interests in the event of a 
terrorist attack. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the Court’s interpretation of the Tenth Amendment, 
the federal government cannot directly prepare or coordinate the 
 
 160. Wiener, supra note 60, at 187 (noting that “[t]he basic fallacy of the 1792 Act was that it 
was unselective” and explaining how the broad definition of the militia in the 1792 Act failed to 
create an effective force such that history quickly made its provisions “obsolete”). 
 161. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
 162. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (giving Congress the power to “provide for” the calling 
forth of the militia); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief 
of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called 
into the actual Service of the United States . . . .”); see also supra note 125 (explaining how the 
Constitution gives the president the authority to make the decision on when to call forth the 
militia). 
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activities of first responders under its commerce power. This Note 
argues that the federal government can exercise significant control 
over first responders by enrolling them as members of the militia. 
Congress has the broad and exclusive power to incorporate citizens 
into the militia. Although first responders would be in noncombat 
roles, history illustrates that army and militia alike may undertake 
noncombat goals and pursue them zealously, especially when the 
noncombat activities contribute to national security, as in the case of 
a terrorist attack. Once the first responders are members of the 
militia, Congress has the power to organize, equip, and discipline 
them into a well-trained team capable of providing immediate and 
effective responses to such attacks. The president would have the 
exclusive authority to call forth the first-responder militia, needing 
only to first determine whether the attack constituted an insurrection 
or invasion. 
In the fight against terrorism, the battle is won at two stages: 
prevention and damage control. Once a terrorist strikes, the only way 
to fight back is by saving as many lives as possible. This means having 
well-equipped first responders on the scene immediately and ensuring 
that they respond effectively and in coordination with other efforts 
that may be taking place around the country. The federal government 
can help achieve this goal, while remaining faithful to the 
Constitution, by incorporating first responders into the militia. Only 
through the heroism of first responders can the United States return 
quickly to its feet after a powerful blow and stand ready to fight. 
